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Southern states in determining whether there is a consensus
among the states with regards to a Constitutional norm.
This Article has termed that Supreme Court position as
“Southern Exception” and can be viewed as an effort by
some Justices to address the unique social, economic, religious and cultural traditions in the South engendered by its
unique" and “exceptional” history. This Article will also explore how this "Southern Exception" affected American jurisprudence to the point of rendering it "exceptional" from
much of the world's jurisprudence, essentially turning the
traditional use of the term "American Exceptionalism" on its
head. This Article will also explore the connection between
the hostility of Justice Scalia and some other Justices to this
“Southern Exception” and their hostility to the use of international and comparative law in general, particularly when
used as a means to circumvent the traditional requirement
of a “national consensus” to establish a constitutional norm.
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INTRODUCTION
The late Justice Scalia has noted that the Supreme Court has repeatedly discounted the position of former Confederate states in determining whether there is a consensus in the country for the adoption of a particular constitutional norm. This disregard of the normal
manner by which the Supreme Court determines whether a consensus exists is termed within this Article the “Southern Exception.” 1
Scalia has argued that some Justices give the laws of the states of
the former Confederacy less weight than the laws of other states
when the Supreme Court is called upon to determine whether there
is a national consensus on a given constitutional issue. 2 The Southern Exception in Supreme Court jurisprudence, as sardonically identified by Justice Scalia, can be viewed as an effort by some Justices
to address the unique social, economic, religious, and cultural traditions in the South engendered by its “exceptional” history of racial
discrimination.
Although this Article specifically focuses on Southern Exceptionalism, this Article will also argue that Southern Exceptionalism
has contributed substantially to making the United States, as a
whole, exceptional from its international peers. This “American Exceptionalism” 3 is a natural result of Southern Exceptionalism. As
such, the American Exceptionalism discussed in this Article is essentially the opposite of the more common use of American Exceptionalism as a description of a morally superior United States. 4 It is
a premise of the Article that for many of the same reasons, Southern
Exceptionalism has rendered the South anomalous as compared to
the rest of the country. As a major part of the United States, it has
also rendered the United States as a whole out of sync with much of
the democratic world in its approach to a wide variety of issues.
This Article will further discuss how this Southern Exceptionalism went well beyond legal issues explicitly dealing with race and
See, e.g., James M. McPherson, Antebellum Southern Exceptionalism: A
New Look at an Old Question, 50 CIV. WAR HIST. 418, 418–19 (2004).
2
See infra Section III.A.
3
For a more thorough discussion on the various attempts to define “American Exceptionalism,” see Ian Tyrrell, American Exceptionalism, From Stalin with
Love, AEON (Oct. 10, 2016), https://aeon.co/ideas/american-exceptionalism-fromstalin-with-love.
4
See id.
1
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covered a broad panoply of issues ranging from juvenile executions
to gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights. For example, in United
States v. Windsor, 5 Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that “the object
of this condemnation is not the legislature of some once-Confederate Southern state (familiar objects of the Court’s scorn, see, e.g.,
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)), but our respected coordinate branches, the Congress and Presidency of the United
States.” 6 This Article will also explore the connection between the
hostility of Justice Scalia and other Justices to this Southern Exception and their hostility to the use of international and comparative
law, particularly when used as a means to circumvent the traditional
requirement of a national consensus to establish a constitutional
norm. 7 This hostility seems all the more remarkable when Justice
Scalia claimed to be a proponent of original intent, 8 yet the Constitution and early American jurisprudence were much less hostile to
international law than is the present Court. Indeed, originalists have
been the jurists who have departed the farthest from the original constitutional view of international law. 9
In determining whether a particular norm should be elevated to
constitutional status, the Court has often, although not always, relied
upon the existence of a consensus among the states. 10 It is when the
Supreme Court has deviated from this consensus-based approach
570 U.S. 744 (2012).
Id. at 795 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding. . . . [W]here there is not first a settled consensus
among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans
through the Constitution.”).
8
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1184 (1989) (“Just as that manner of textual exegesis facilitates the
formulation of general rules, so does, in the constitutional field, adherence to a
more or less originalist theory of construction.”).
9
Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land”) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 539 (1832) (citing the Supremacy
Clause to strike down a Georgia law because it conflicted with a treaty between
the United States and the sovereign Cherokee Nation), with Thompson, 487 U.S.
at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10
See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407–12 (1857).
5
6
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that the Southern Exception has become most evident. 11 Justice
Scalia alluded to this Southern Exception to condemn the Court’s
apparent devaluation of the Southern states in evaluating whether
there is a consensus. Scalia’s frustration was particularly evident in
not only United States v. Windsor, 12 a landmark gay marriage case,
but also in cases such as Thompson v. Oklahoma 13 and Stanford v.
Kentucky, 14 both of which addressed the juvenile death penalty. In
the death penalty cases, Justice Scalia decried the alleged substitution of consensus within the United States with foreign and international consensus and the simultaneous discounting of broad Southern support for the juvenile death penalty. 15
This Article argues that Justice Scalia was factually correct as to
the existence of a Southern Exception, but that he conveniently overlooked the roots of why such an exception exists. Scalia implied that
it is borne of an irrational anti-Southern bias, whereas the reality is
far more complex—there are historical and judicial reasons as to
why the Court would apply this exception. The Confederate Exception is arguably a recognition that the 200 years of slavery and almost 100 years of apartheid in many parts of the United States did
indeed render this country’s legal jurisprudence exceptional. 16
Moreover, to the extent the South was exceptional, its weight in the
body politic and Supreme Court rendered U.S. jurisprudence itself
exceptional with respect to the rest of the world. For example, large
parts of the United States practiced segregation at a time when apartheid was widely condemned in international law and by the great
Obvious examples of this deviation are Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 489–93 (1954), or Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1967), both
decided at times when there was no clear national consensus on the respective
issues of segregation and miscegenation laws.
12
See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 795 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–73 (1989) (Scalia, J.), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
15
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford, 492 U.S.
at 369 n.1 (“We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive, rejecting the contention . . . that the sentencing practices of other
countries are relevant.”).
16
See infra Section I.A.
11
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majority of the world’s countries. 17 With the Court’s frequent efforts
to adopt anti-civil rights positions, 18 the issue of why Justice Scalia
and other conservative Justices were so protective of states’ rights
yet simultaneously hostile to international definitions of human
rights norms and the expansion of civil rights on the domestic level
is a much larger topic and would require speculating as to the mental
state of those Justices. However, one can argue that those Justices’
resentment of the Southern Exception and their hostility to international and comparative law are not mere happenstance. 19
The divergence of values between the former Confederate states,
Northern states, and other democracies becomes particularly evident
in the interpretation of constitutional norms. 20 Presumably, the
Court consciously—or subconsciously—acknowledged this exceptional history when evaluating which norms are emblematic of the
practices of “civilized” nations. 21 As noted above, the Court has
done so by its tendency to accord less value to the legal norms of
Southern states when those states’ norms conflict with a majority of
the United States and the vast majority of the “civilized” world.
Southern Exceptionalism is all the more pronounced in the interpretation of constitutional provisions. The Constitution, providing the political structure of the country, enshrined the compromise
between the Northern and Southern states over slavery at the country’s inception. 22 Thus, much of the Constitution and its interpretation has been intertwined with the institution of slavery and the later
17
Lennox S. Hinds, The Gross Violations of Human Rights of the Apartheid
Regime Under International Law, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 231, 310–11
(1999).
18
See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–07 (1857).
19
See infra Part III.
20
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–92 (1986) (citing Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–26 (1939)); see also Moreover: The Cruel and
Ever More Unusual Punishment, ECONOMIST (May 13, 1999) https://www.economist.com/moreover/1999/05/13/the-cruel-and-ever-more-unusual-punishment
(Eng.) (discussing the United States’ deviation from the international consensus
of large democracies on the death penalty).
21
See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988).
22
A few provisions within the Constitution are relevant, such as the “threefifths compromise,” found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. This provision guarantees each state a number of representatives, determined by the state’s population
size. Id. However, “other persons,” or slaves, within that population were counted
as three-fifths of a whole person. Id. Southerners desired that the population count
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systematic oppression of people of African descent. 23 Further, constitutional provisions—particularly the Bill of Rights—often contain broad and vague language and thus tend to be a particularly pronounced flash point for differences over whether there is a consensus among the states regarding constitutional rights. 24 For example,
what kind of conduct constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment”
and what are the norms of “civilized” nations in the context of the
Eighth Amendment? 25 Some Justices felt it necessary to employ international and comparative norms specifically because many states,
include slaves as whole persons—in turn bolstering the number of Southern-state
representatives. See Theodore R. Johnson, We Used to Count Black Americans as
3/5 of a Person. For Reparations, Give Them 5/3 of a Vote., WASH. POST.:
POSTEVERYTHING (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/08/21/we-used-to-count-black-americans-as-35-of-a-person-instead-of-reparations-give-them-53-of-a-vote/. Another provision found in Article
I contains an express limitation on Congress’ ability to prohibit the importation of
slaves prior to 1808. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. Finally, as an effort to resolve the
extradition plight faced by slave states at the time, the drafters included the Fugitive Slaves Clause, requiring states to return escaped slaves, or “Person[s] held to
Service or Labour,” to the state from which the slave escaped. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 2, cl. 3. Without the inclusion of these provisions condoning slavery, many
in the Northern states feared the South would elect to create a nation of their own,
thereby dividing the nation into two. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 507
(1857) (suggesting that the clauses relating to slavery likely “embody some compromise among the statesmen of that time”).
23
See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450–52 (finding an act of Congress that
restricted the institution of slavery was “not warranted by the Constitution” and
therefore void). The Dred Scott decision is notable because the Court went
through extraordinary lengths to twist factual reality to justify the institution of
slavery. For example, Justice Taney claimed that, at the time of the Constitution’s
inception, the opinion of the “civilized portion of the white race” was “fixed and
universal” that people of African descent were an “inferior class of beings, who
had been subjugated by the dominant race” and who “had no rights or privileges . . . .” Id. at 404–07. However, reality shows, and Justice Taney later
acknowledged, that his argument was ill-considered, as nations around the globe
began to prohibit or limit the institution of slavery. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Foreign Authority, American Exceptionalism, and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 393, 423–24 (2007) (discussing the utter lack of support behind Taney’s
assertion of a universally held view that blacks “were not part of the polity of any
civilized state at the time of the Founding”).
24
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–01 (1958).
25
See id. at 99–104 (1958) (holding that the Eighth Amendment did not allow
Congress to revoke petitioner’s citizenship as consequence for crime).
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primarily former slave states, were so exceptional in the manner in
which they interpreted these constitutional norms. 26
For a concrete illustration of how this Confederate Exception affects American jurisprudence, one has only to look at some of the
more recent opinions by Justice Kennedy. Although Justice Kennedy was a relatively conservative Justice, he nevertheless earned
the ire of fellow conservatives by arguing that laws such as the juvenile death penalty 27 or laws against same-gender sexual activity 28
were unconstitutional because the United States was the only industrialized nation to have them. In the case of juvenile death penalties,
the United States was for the most part alone among the world’s
nations. 29 Justice Scalia, in numerous bitter ripostes, argued that foreign and comparative law had no place in determining whether a
consensus existed in America with regard to interpretation of a particular constitutional norm. 30 However, Justice Scalia qualified this
argument by stating that international law may be useful in determining whether such a previously existing consensus was a coincidence or something more fundamental to all “civilized” societies
and thus deserving of constitutional protection. 31
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
Id.; see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 5-4, Forbids Execution in
Juvenile Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/02/politics/supreme-court-54-forbids-execution-in-juvenilecrime.html.
28
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (relying on a decision from
the European Court of Human Rights in reasoning that outlawing homosexuality
is unconstitutional); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Legalize Gay Sexual Conduct in Sweeping Reversal of Court’s ‘86 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/27/us/supreme-court-homosexualrights-justices-6-3-legalize-gay-sexual-conduct.html.
29
Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (2005) (“[I]t is fair to say that the United States
now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death
penalty.”). However, the United States was not truly alone, as juvenile executions
have continued post-Roper in some countries, particularly Iran, but also Yemen,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. See
AMNESTY INT’L, EXECUTION OF JUVENILES SINCE 1990 AS OF DECEMBER 2018, at
1 (2018), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/act5095112018english.pdf.
30
See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (Scalia, J.).
31
See id. In Stanford, Scalia quoted his own dissenting opinion in Thompson
v. Oklahoma: “The practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can
be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not
26
27
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Likely in response to Justice Scalia’s arguments, Justice Kennedy changed tactics, arguing in Roper v. Simmons, 32 for example,
that international and comparative norms were helpful but not dispositive in determining the meaning of such norms. Justice Scalia,
utterly unconvinced, continued to deride such an approach, contending that Kennedy’s argument was a run-around Southern states by
implying a Southern Exception. 33
THE EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR APPLYING THE “SOUTHERN
EXCEPTION” IN U.S. JURISPRUDENCE

I.
A.

The Unique Racial Construct of Slavery and
Apartheid in the United States
The history of American slavery and apartheid illustrates just
how legally and normatively exceptional the Confederate states
were from the rest of America and the world, including those countries from which the United States has received its legal traditions.
In 2006, the Trustees of Brown University published a report
examining the Brown family’s role in the slave trade (the “Brown
Report”). 34 The Brown Report provides, inter alia, a thorough examination of the racialized nature of American slavery, 35 which was
noted to be exceptional even in comparison to other countries that

merely a historical accident, but rather so ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ that it occupies a place not merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our
Constitution as well.” Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)
(Cardozo, J.)). Scalia’s analysis overlooks, for example, the glaring reality that
there was no consensus in the United States regarding mixed-race marriages at
the time Loving v. Virginia was handed down in 1967—indeed, an overwhelming
majority of white Americans disapproved of interracial marriages in 1968. See
Joseph Carroll, Most Americans Approve of Interracial Marriages, GALLUP (Aug.
16, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/28417/Most-Americans-Approve-Interracial-Marriages.aspx (noting that seventy-five percent of white respondents disapproved of interracial marriages in 1968, while just seventeen percent approved).
32
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
33
See id. at 609, 628.
34
BROWN U. STEERING COMM. ON SLAVERY & JUST., SLAVERY AND JUSTICE
15–17 (2006), http://brown.edu/Research/Slavery_Justice/documents/SlaveryAndJustice.pdf [hereinafter Brown Report].
35
Id. at 8.
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had slavery. 36 The Brown Report went so far as to argue that the
United States’ system of slavery was historically unique in its racialized nature. 37 As noted by the Brown Report:
Few if any societies in history carried this logic further than the United States, where people of African
descent came to be regarded as a distinct “race” of
persons, fashioned by nature for hard labor.
....
If American slavery has any claims to being historically “peculiar,” its peculiarity lay in its rigorous racialism, the systematic way in which racial ideas
were used to demean and deny the humanity of people of even partial African descent. This historical
legacy would make the process of incorporating the
formerly enslaved as citizens far more problematic in
the United States than in other New World slave societies. 38
The racialized nature of American slavery could help explain
why the United States was also historically unique in its racial attitudes after slavery. For example, Brazil’s history of slavery lasted
even longer than that of the United States, yet Brazil did not legally
and systematically institutionalize racism after slavery to the extent
that the United States did. 39 It is important to note that the Brown
Report does not indicate that American slavery was distinctive in its
cruelty. 40 For instance, slavery in other civilizations was sometimes
based on religion, such as the traditional Christian justifications for

Id.
See generally id. (detailing the history of racialized slavery in the United
States).
38
Id.
39
See HERBERT S. KLEIN, AFRICAN SLAVERY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN 217–18, 223–24 (1st ed. 1986).
40
Brown Report, supra note 34, at 7–8.
36
37
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slavery 41 or the dictate in the Torah that Hebrews should not enslave
other Hebrews. 42 Slavery was also a common result of conquest,
punishment, or other non-explicitly racial criteria. 43 In the United
States, however, these traditional justifications were ultimately superseded by a justification based on the alleged inferiority of the
African “race.” 44 Thus, while numerous other civilizations did have
slavery, the United States took the radical approach of basing slavery entirely on race, relegating people of African descent to a kind
of subhuman status. 45 This view was explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court in Dred Scott, 46 and continued to influence American

See Noel Rae, How Christian Slaveholders Used the Bible to Justify Slavery, TIME (Feb. 23, 2018), http://time.com/5171819/christianity-slavery-book-excerpt/ (highlighting slaveholders’—most of whom identified as Christian—two
favorite texts from the Bible).
42
James A. Diamond, The Treatment of Non-Israelite Slaves: From Moses
to Moses, THETORAH.COM (Apr. 19, 2016), https://thetorah.com/the-treatmentof-non-israelite-slaves-from-moses-to-moses/ (stating that, initially, the differences between Hebrew slaves and non-Hebrew slaves were that the latter were
“permanent acquisitions and never had to be freed.”).
43
See KLEIN, supra note 39, at 1–4.
44
See Brown Report, supra note 34, at 8. The Brown Report notes that, similar to much of the rest of the world, the American colonists initially relied on
religion and culture as justifications for slavery. Id. These rationalizations were
later replaced by an “explicit theory of race” by the time of the American Revolution. Id.
45
Id.
46
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857) (“they [persons of
African descent] were at that time [of the founding] considered as a subordinate
and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race”).
Much of the Court’s reasoning in Dred Scott was based on what it considered as
the view of society during the Framer’s time—that society had relegated the existence of African slaves to that of being bought and sold, treated as mere chattel,
and used for profit. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. The Court also references two
clauses in the Constitution “which point directly and specifically to the negro race
as a separate class of persons,” and specifically argues, in reference to the importation sanctions of 1808, that these sanctions were “unquestionably of persons of
the race of [African descent], as the traffic in slaves in the United States had always been confined to [persons of African descent].” Id. at 411.
41
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jurisprudence throughout the rest of the Nineteenth Century and beyond. 47 For instance, in the 1967 case Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court quoted the following portion of the 1959 trial court’s
opinion:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow,
malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.
The fact that he separated the races shows that he did
not intend for the races to mix. 48
The Brown Report summarizes empirical data demonstrating
that the former slave states were indeed exceptional in their attitudes
towards African Americans. 49 States continued to legally oppress
individuals of African descent well after slavery’s formal demise
through apartheid and other laws designed to separate, exploit, and
otherwise oppress African Americans. 50 American apartheid extended to basic functions of society, such as swimming pools, libraries, and transportation; 51 as well as to public schools, 52 marriage, 53
politics, and numerous other areas of societal activity. 54 It even
criminalized non-public activities such as mixed-race playing of

47
See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding—nearly
forty years after Dred Scott v. Sandford—the notion that those of African descent
are inferior).
48
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
49
See Brown Report, supra note 34 at 67–68.
50
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543 (1896) (announcing the separate but equal doctrine, the Court states that “[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction
between the white and colored races . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal
equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.”).
51
See Segregation in Public Places, AM. PUB. MEDIA, http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/remembering/public.html (last visited Apr. 3,
2019).
52
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544–45.
53
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (striking down Virginia’s miscegenation statutes).
54
Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow
and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 92
(2008).
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checkers or dominoes. 55 From the post-Civil War period until the
early 1960s, systematic governmental discrimination permeated
many American states—particularly the Southern states, which had
practiced slavery—and relegated the United States to the unenviable
status of being one of only a handful of countries with systematic
segregation or apartheid. 56
B.

The Extension of This Unique Construction
of Race to Religion
It is difficult to understand the unique American manner of legal
subjugation of African Americans without understanding the mutually reinforcing impacts of slavery and religion. The North American racialization of slavery is evidenced in the racist interpretations
of Christianity that took root on American soil. 57 This discussion is
essential because of the historically close connection between religion and law. 58 Religion provides a theological justification for the
existing societal order, as is reflected in society’s laws. 59

David Pilgrim, What Was Jim Crow, FERRIS ST. UNIV. JIM CROW MUSEUM
RACIST MEMORABILIA, http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm (last visited
Oct. 13, 2019).
56
See Hinds, supra note 17 (detailing the United States’ troubled history with
racism and apartheid politics). From 1948–1994, South Africa maintained a system of apartheid that was analogous to that of the United States. Id. at 258, 316–
17. Apartheid in South Africa was “a state system which organized the machinery
of law, government and law enforcement to force the whole population into an
exploitative economy, which excluded eighty percent of the population from control of the land and its resources, and maintained this control, without democratic
participation and consent.” Id. at 249. See also Rupert Cornwell, Ian Smith: Rhodesian Prime Minister Who Attempted to Prevent Black Rule by Declaring Independence from Britain, INDEP. (Nov. 22, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/ian-smith-rhodesian-prime-minister-who-attemptedto-prevent-black-rule-by-declaring-independence-758993.html (detailing Southern Rhodesia’s (today called Zimbabwe) prime minister’s efforts to prevent
“black rule” in the mid-twentieth century).
57
See Rae, supra note 41.
58
See Aernout J. Nieuwenhuis, State and Religion, a Multidimensional Relationship: Some Comparative Law Remarks, 10 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 153, 153
(2012).
59
See Rae, supra note 41. The Virginia Supreme Court has often connected
religion and slavery, as demonstrated in its rationale for upholding miscegenation
statutes that punished interracial marriages:
55
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Indeed, the major Christian denominations in the United States
split along each region’s respective approach to slavery and apartheid. 60 As a general observation, those areas of the United States
that practiced slavery and institutionalized apartheid are, for the
most part, the same areas of the United States where Christian denominations that historically justified slavery and apartheid are predominant. 61 As Professor William Eskridge has observed, religion
frequently conflates status, belief, and conduct. 62 Put another way,
it can be argued that religion functions as a normative justification
for pre-existing societal and economic conditions. 63 In the case of
American slavery and apartheid, the need for religious justifications
was all the more pressing because of the controversial nature of
those institutions.
One example of this phenomenon can be witnessed in the historical position of the Southern Baptist Convention (the “SBC”), 64
which has traditionally been the largest Protestant denomination in
the United States and traditionally dominant in the Southern states
that practiced slavery and apartheid. 65 The SBC was created when
the Baptists split into Northern and Southern Baptists, specifically

The right to regulate the institution of marriage; to classify the
parties and persons who may lawfully marry; to dissolve the
relation by divorce; and to impose such restraints upon the relation as the laws of God, and the laws of propriety, morality
and social order demand, has been exercised by all civilized
governments in all ages of the world.
Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 752 (Va. 1955) (emphasis added) (quoting Kinney
v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858, 862 (Va. 1878)).
60
See infra notes 64–69; Brown Report, supra note 34, at 8.
61
James D. Wilets, From Divergence to Convergence? A Comparative and
International Law Analysis of LGBTI Rights in the Context of Race and PostColonialism, 21 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 631, 634 (2011).
62
William N. Eskridge Jr., Noah’s Curse: How Religion Often Conflates Status, Belief, and Conduct to Resist Antidiscrimination Norms, 45 GA. L. REV. 657,
666–68 (2011).
63
See id.
64
See Adeel Hassan, Oldest Institution of Southern Baptist Convention Reveals Past Ties to Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/us/southern-baptist-slavery.html?searchResultPosition=1.
65
Wilets, supra note 61 at 656.
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because of slavery, and the split continued due to the Southern Baptists’ support of apartheid. 66 The Northern Baptists, who, as a whole,
were anti-slavery and anti-segregation, formed the American Baptist Churches, USA. 67 The SBC itself issued an apology in 1995 on
its involvement with slavery and racism on the 150th Anniversary
of the SBC in Atlanta, Georgia. 68 In its apology, the SBC stated:
WHEREAS, Our relationship to African-Americans
has been hindered from the beginning by the role that
slavery played in the formation of the Southern Baptist Convention; and
WHEREAS, Many of our Southern Baptist forbears
defended the right to own slaves, and either participated in, supported, or acquiesced in the particularly
inhumane nature of American slavery; and
WHEREAS, In later years Southern Baptists failed,
in many cases, to support, and in some cases opposed, legitimate initiatives to secure the civil rights
of African-Americans; and
WHEREAS, Racism has led to discrimination, oppression, injustice, and violence, both in the Civil
War and throughout the history of our nation; and
WHEREAS, Racism has divided the body of Christ
and Southern Baptists in particular, and separated us
from our African-American brothers and sisters; and
WHEREAS, Many of our congregations have intentionally and/or unintentionally excluded African66
Hassan, supra note 64 (“The denomination began in 1845 when it split
from Baptists in the North over slavery.”).
67
See What We Believe: Our History, AM. BAPTIST CHURCHES USA,
https://www.abc-usa.org/what-we-believe/our-history/ (last visited Aug. 15,
2019).
68
Resolution on Racial Reconciliation on the 150th Anniversary of the Southern Baptist Convention, S. BAPTIST CONVENTION (1995), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/899/resolution-on-racial-reconciliation-on-the-150th-anniversary-ofthe-southern-baptist-convention (admitting to and apologizing for the Southern
Baptist Convention’s intimate ties to American slavery).
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Americans from worship, membership, and leadership; and
WHEREAS, Racism profoundly distorts our understanding of Christian morality, leading some Southern Baptists to believe that racial prejudice and discrimination are compatible with the Gospel . . . . 69
The development of particular denominations on U.S. soil to rationalize slavery begs the question of why many other countries,
which also had slavery, did not develop specific religions or religious tenets to justify their racist and social institutions. 70 It can be
argued, as a historical matter, that many of the settlers to the United
States viewed themselves as morally exceptional from the European
societies from which they emigrated. 71
While this sense of American Exceptionalism may permeate the
American psyche, it does not fully explain the difference between
the generally prevalent phenomenon of American Exceptionalism
and the development of a particularly exceptional Southern approach to law, religion, and social norms. 72 Participants in slavery
in the South had a particular onus to demonstrate that they too were
morally exceptional and had to reconcile their enslavement of human beings with their professed religiosity and putative moral exceptionalism. 73 If one thinks of religion as “the law” and slavery as
“the facts” of one’s behavior, then a way to conform one’s behavior
to “the law” is to change the characterization of “the facts.” As Carl
Sandburg famously stated: “If the law is against you, talk about the
evidence. If the evidence is against you, talk about the law, and,
Id.
See generally, e.g., HERBERT KLEIN, SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF VIRGINIA AND CUBA 105–126 (1988) (comparing the
instrumental role that Catholicism had in shaping Cuban slavery with instrumental
role that slavery had in shaping Virginian Anglicanism).
71
See id. at 122 (“Unlike the clergy of Cuba, the clergy of Virginia was unable to convince the planters that emancipation was a good act in the sight of God
and was to be considered a common and accepted form of pious action.”); see
also Joshua Zeitz, How Trump is Making Us Rethink American Exceptionalism,
(Jan.
7,
2018),
https://www.politico.com/magaPOLITICO
zine/story/2018/01/07/trump-american-exceptionalism-history-216253.
72
See McPherson, supra note 1, at 431–33.
73
Id.
69
70
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since you ask me, if the law and the evidence are both against you,
then pound on the table and yell like hell.” 74 The Supreme Court
demonstrated this very phenomenon when it stated in Dred Scott v.
Sandford that even free individuals of African descent could not be
United States citizens, even if citizens of a state, because they were
not in fact “people” within the meaning of the Constitution, nor did
any single person in the civilized world regard them as such. 75 Justice Taney’s language is stunning in the factual assumptions he
made to reconcile his version of the law with the facts before him:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether
unfit to associate with the white race, either in social
or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect;
and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and
sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by
it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal
in the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics,
which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be
open to dispute; and men in every grade and position
in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their
private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness
of this opinion. 76
What stands out in Justice Taney’s opinion is his factual statement that the opinion—white supremacy—“was at that time fixed
and universal” for the Founders. 77 However, many educated people
at the time of Dred Scott likely understood that people doubted the
correctness of slavery even at the time the Constitution was written.

74
75
76
77

CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 69 (1936).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1857).
Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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Slavery was a divisive issue at the time of the Constitutional Convention. 78 It was such a contested concept that one of the few places
the Constitution actually regulates the behavior of individuals is
with respect to slavery, effectively forcing the federal government
to enforce the institution, 79 even as the federal government was forbidden to interfere with any other kind of state violation of human
rights. 80
It should not be surprising that the Southern-based religions
were able to change the very tenets of the religion to justify slavery,
given that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court could characterize
slavery in a manner that he knew was incorrect and that many people
throughout the country felt was incorrect. 81 Moreover, the Chief
Justice likely knew that educated people understood that what he
was saying was false. 82 What begs further exploration is why other
contemporaneous slave societies felt no such need to conform their
religions to their realities, even though the legal definitions of colonial empires such as Spain and Portugal and the Netherlands inherited their definitions of slavery through the Catholic Church. 83
Indeed, at first the American colonies had no specific legal theory regarding slavery. 84 As documented by historian Edmund Morgan, the first Africans brought to the United States were indentured
servants, not slaves, who intermarried with other white indentured

See Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little
Gained, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 413, 426 (2001) (“Delegates from Connecticut
and Massachusetts were especially afraid that if slavery were explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution it would not be ratified in the North.”)
79
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
80
Not until the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 did the federal government gain this authority. See id. amend. XIV.
81
See Sarah Goldberg, et al., Dickinson and Slavery, DICKINSON: HOUSE
DIVIDED PROJECT, http://housedivided.dickinson.edu/sites/slavery/people/rogertaney/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (noting that Taney emancipated his own slaves
prior to the Dred Scott decision, and his pro-slavery verdict was publicly
disapproved of as the decision led to the election of Abraham Lincoln for
president).
82
See id.
83
Brown Report, supra note 34, at 8.
84
Id. at 8.
78
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servants. 85 Morgan describes the transformation of free African indentured servants into slaves, largely to prevent the ever-growing
free indentured servant population from overwhelming the plantation owners. 86 In effect, the transformation of Africans from indentured servants into slaves was a necessary prerequisite for the ultimate establishment of a successful republic, at least for the white
population. 87 Thus, with the transformation of indentured servitude
to slavery for Africans, 88 the American colonies, and later the
United States, developed their own legal foundations for slavery.
Consistent with Morgan’s documentation, the Brown Report observed that “the laws they fashioned, beginning in Virginia in the
1620s and continuing through the Civil War, were historically unprecedented in their complete denial of the legal personality of the
enslaved. Slaves in North America were chattel, no different in law
from horses, handlooms, or other pieces of disposable property.” 89
This unique American moralistic view of slavery, buttressed by a
deep racially influenced “religiosity,” arguably helped the creation
of the American system of apartheid even after the end of slavery. 90
This also helps explain why race has continued to play a dominant
role in political and cultural discourse in the United States long after
the abolishment of slavery and even after the termination of apartheid.
II.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTHERN EXCEPTIONALISM
AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

A.

The Southern Stranglehold over the National Body Politic
and Its Cultural Influence in the North
Although this Article specifically focuses on Southern Exceptionalism, it is important to note that racial discrimination against
85
EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY-AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 154–57 (1976).
86
Id. at 385–86; Indentured Servants in the U.S., SOUTH FLORIDA PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/indentured-servants-in-the-us/
(last visited Aug. 15, 2019).
87
MORGAN, supra note 85, at 386.
88
SOUTH FLORIDA PBS, supra note 86; see also MORGAN, supra note 85 at
385–86.
89
Brown Report, supra note 34 at 8.
90
See KLEIN, supra note 70, at 122.
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non-European ethnic groups was not limited to the South. 91 While
this phenomenon would seem to undercut the premise of this Article, it instead demonstrates the close connection between Southern
Exceptionalism and American Exceptionalism.
Northern political parties themselves frequently promulgated
discriminatory laws. 92 Additionally, after the Civil War, the South
was able to increase its political power as black individuals in the
South counted as a full person for purposes of electoral apportionment, rather than three-fifths of a person, as slaves, under the original Constitution. 93 As blacks were gradually denied the franchise in
the South, white representation in the Southern states in Congress
dramatically expanded. 94 Southern states were granted credit in
Congress and the Electoral College for their entire populations while
those same states denied the franchise to their black citizens. 95
In addition to the political influence of the South in the national
body politic, racist attitudes and even legally discriminatory policies
permeated well beyond the South. 96 This permeation should not be
surprising given that the United States was still one country and cultural and racial attitudes could not be neatly confined to discrete regions. Not until the 1948 decision in Shelley v. Kraemer were restrictive covenants prohibiting the sale of homes to blacks forbidden. 97 Northerners were also keenly aware of the large AfricanAmerican population in close geographical proximity, contributing
to racial fears of Northern whites. One striking example of this is
91
See, e.g., ROY BECK, THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION 35–42 (1996) (arguing against immigration by looking at historical hostility to immigrants).
92
See, e.g., DeNeen L. Brown, When Portland Banned Blacks: Oregon’s
Shameful History as an ‘All-White’ State, WASH. POST (June 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/06/07/when-portland-banned-blacks-oregons-shameful-history-as-an-all-whitestate/?utm_term=.6b8c2b207f75.
93
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 with id. amend. XIV; see also
Johnson, supra note 22.
94
Johnson, supra note 22.
95
Id.
96
Carlton Waterhouse, Avoiding Another Step in a Series of Unfortunate Legal Events: A Consideration of Black Life Under American Law from 1619 to
1972 and a Challenge to Prevailing Notions of Legally Based Reparations, 26
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 245 (2006) (citing JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA:
ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS 62–67 (2000)).
97
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21–23 (1948).

2019]

JUSTICE SCALIA GOT IT RIGHT, BUT FOR THE WRONG REASONS

129

Oregon’s constitution, which originally forbade any black Americans from even residing in the state. 98 The stranglehold that primarily Southern racial attitudes had on the country as a whole is clearly
shown in the federal policies of the period after the Civil War—the
federal government actively participated in social and economic
subordination of African Americans through the organization of federal programs and employment policies. 99
One example of broad American Exceptionalism in a religious
context is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“LDS”),
the adherents of which are sometimes incorrectly referred to as Mormons. 100 LDS has historically evidenced a strong racist theology. 101
LDS theologians have based this theology on the presumed inferiority of African Americans. 102 In his Journal of Discourses,
Brigham Young explained the Mormon theology with respect to
black Africans:
Shall I tell you the law of God in regard to the African Race? If the white man who belongs to the chosen seed mixes his blood with the seed of Cain, the
penalty, under the law of God, is death on the spot.
This will always be so. 103
....
You see some classes of the human family that are
black, uncouth, uncomely, disagreeable and low in
their habits, wild, and seemingly deprived of nearly
OR. CONST. art. I, § 3 (repealed 1926); see also DeNeen, supra note 92.
See generally FEAGIN, supra note 96, at 179–85 (discussing government
social and economic programs and their effect on African Americans).
100
See Amanda Casanova, Mormons - 10 Things to Know About the Church
of Latter Day Saints, CHRISTIANITY.COM (May 21, 2018), https://www.christianity.com/church/denominations/are-mormons-christians-10-things-to-knowabout-the-church-of-latter-day-saints.html.
101
Mormon Racism in Perspective: An Example for Possible Future Changes
in Policy Relating to Women and Gays, LDS-MORMON.COM, http://www.lds-mormon.com/racism.shtml (reproducing a speech by Elder Mark E. Peterson given at
Convention of Teachers and of Religion on the College at Brigham Young University in 1954).
102
Id.
103
7 BRIGHAM YOUNG, ET AL., JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 290 (1854),
https://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/digital/collection/JournalOfDiscourses3/id/2854.
98
99
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all the blessings of the intelligence that is generally
bestowed upon mankind. The first man that committed the odious crime of killing one of his brethren
will be cursed the longest of any one of the children
of Adam. Cain slew his brother. Cain might have
been killed, and that would have put a termination to
that line of human beings. This was not to be, and the
Lord put a mark upon him, which is the flat nose and
black skin. Trace mankind down to after the flood,
and then another curse is pronounced upon the same
race—that they should be the “servant of servants;”
and they will be, until that curse is removed. 104
In 1978, the LDS Church announced that God had removed the
“curse of Cain” upon African Americans when God allegedly made
a divine revelation to church head Spencer Kimball that blacks could
become priests. 105
The racism embedded in both the Southern strain of the Baptist
faith 106 and the LDS Church, 107 both religions indigenous to the
United States, 108 provides a broader context for understanding both
the Southern and American forms of legal exceptionalism with respect to race.
A COMPARATIVE VIEW: THE DEBATE OVER
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
As discussed previously, Southern Exceptionalism has been part
of the larger debate over American Exceptionalism. Often, it is
Southern Exceptionalism that has an outsized role in relegating the
United States to the dubious position of being an international outcast in relation to many of its international peers with respect to sevIII.

104
10 BRIGHAM YOUNG, ET AL., JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 110 (1854),
https://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/digital/collection/JournalOfDiscourses3/id/4266.
105
Eskridge, supra note 62, at 681–85 (discussing Christian fundamentalists’
discriminatory views against gay people and comparing them to the Christian fundamentalists’ discriminatory views against racial minorities during colonial
times).
106
Hassan, supra note 64.
107
Mormon Racism in Perspective, supra note 101.
108
Casanova, supra note 100; Hassan, supra note 64;
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eral contemporary social issues. On numerous occasions, the Southern states have held positions that are inconsistent with international
norms. For example, in the years since the civil rights era, these
states have persisted in limiting national progress on issues relating
to juvenile executions, gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and voting
rights. On all of these matters, the United States was until recently—
or in some cases still remains—an international outlier.
A.
Juvenile Executions
Nowhere has the United States been more exceptional in comparison to the rest of the “civilized” world than in the area of juvenile executions. At the time of the 2005 Supreme Court decision in
Roper v. Simmons, which found juvenile executions violative of the
Eighth Amendment, 109 the United States was among the very few
countries in the world that still legally executed juveniles. 110 This
timeframe is truly extraordinary when one considers the horrendous
human rights record of some countries that banned the practice before the United States. 111
The Roper case illustrates the tension between Justices Kennedy
and Scalia. Justice Kennedy did not hesitate to use comparative law
and international norms as factors in deciding cases, 112 while Justice
Scalia vehemently argued against using international or comparative
law to demonstrate a consensus on a topic. 113 However, Justice
Scalia’s disdain for using international or comparative law in almost
any capacity in American courts was evident years before the Roper
decision. 114 This disdain seems to be correlated with his reaction to
543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29, at 1.
111
Prior to Roper, countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia had, at least publicly, denounced juvenile executions by ratifying the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, while the United States still legally condoned the practice. See id. Iran and Saudi Arabia, two countries that abolished juvenile executions prior to the United States, have been cited for horrendous human rights violations. BRAD ADAMS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT FOR 2004,
at 460–66, 480–86, (2005), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2005.pdf (providing a detailed account of the human rights
abuses of Iran and Saudi Arabia).
112
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–77.
113
See id. at 610–11.
114
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868, n.4 (1988).
109
110
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the Southern Exception. 115 While the South was out of step with the
rest of the country, it was even more misaligned with the rest of the
democratic, industrialized world. 116 After all, the South comprised
a substantial portion of the United States population, but it comprised a much smaller portion of the industrialized world. If Justice
Scalia and several other conservative Justices deeply resented the
non-Southern portion of the United States imposing its views on the
Southern states, they were even more resentful of the rest of the
world doing the same. As started above, this Article does not purport
to speculate as to the deeper reasons for these Justices’ position visà-vis states’ rights, but only to illustrate the patterns these reasons
present.
For example, Justice Scalia took umbrage with Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma, which held juvenile executions
unconstitutional where the person in question was fifteen years old
at the time of committing a capital offense. 117 While Stevens cited
international and comparative law in support of the Court’s definition of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society,” 118 Scalia vigorously dissented, writing against
the use of comparative or international law as legitimate factors in
determining whether a “consensus” existed on the issue. 119 Years
later, Justice Scalia’s objection to this procedure was even greater in
Roper v. Simmons where he said, “[a]cknowledgment of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part
of the basis for the Court’s judgment—which is surely what it parades as today.” 120
B.
Gender Equality
The United States has found itself as an international outsider in
yet another subject area—gender equality. Amongst its international
peers, the United States ranked fifty-first in the World Economic

115
116
117
118
119
120

See id.
See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 29, at 1.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
Id. at 821, 830–31.
Id. at 868, n.4.
Id. at 628.
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Forum’s 2018 Global Gender Gap report. 121 Further, the United
States had a score of 0.72 out of 1.00, with 1.00 equaling complete
parity between the sexes. 122 Between having the highest rate of maternal deaths compared to any other country in the developed
world 123 or a lackluster number of women in high government positions, 124 inter alia, the United States ranks behind almost all other
industrialized nations.
As in the case of juvenile executions, the Southern states accounted for much of this American Exceptionalism. When one looks
closer at the statistics, there remains a chasm within the United
States between the Southern states and the rest of the nation. 125 Although this proposition and the following discussion are sociological observations, and not strictly legal conclusions, they illustrate
the connections between these sets of social, “hot-button” issues and
the regional variation with respect to race. There is not an obvious
reason why racism should be correlated with sexism, homophobia,
executions of juveniles, or other traditionally conservative positions
on social issues, but the correlation has been consistent with the legal positions of Justice Scalia and similarly-minded Justices. Why
this correlation should exist is, once again, beyond the scope of this
Article, and the answer most likely lies in the realm of psychology
and sociology.
As an example of this correlation, a study comparing women
throughout the country graded each state based on findings across
six categories: political participation, employment and earnings,
work and family, poverty and opportunity, health and wellbeing, and
reproductive rights. 126 Overall, no Southern state received a grade
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2018, at
287 (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf.
122
Id.
123
Nina Martin & Renee Montage, U.S. Has the Worst Rate of Maternal
Deaths in the Developed World, NPR (May 12, 2017, 10:28 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2017/05/12/528098789/u-s-has-the-worst-rate-of-maternaldeaths-in-the-developed-world.
124
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 121, at 287.
125
JULIE ANDERSON ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, STATUS
OF WOMEN IN THE SOUTH: 2016, at xxii–xxv (2016), http://statusofwomendata.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/SWSouth2.24-for-postingonline.pdf (summarizing key findings of research on women living in the South).
126
Id.
121
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above a C-, and the majority of the Southern states received some
version of a D grade. 127 Some of the worst discrepancies involved
pay. It is estimated that in 2014, working women in the South earned
on average $6,392 less due to wage inequality among the sexes. 128
Collectively, working women in the South lose an estimated $155.4
billion per year due to wage discrepancy between men and
women. 129
Besides the differences in pay gaps, the lack of paid family leave
across the Southern states is another factor that makes the United
States, as a whole, perform less favorably with respect to gender
than its international counterparts. In the United States, not one
Southern state requires paid leave to its employees 130 whereas several non-Southern states do. 131 Furthermore, when compared to
forty-one other nations in a survey conducted by the Organization
for Economic Development (“OECD”), the United States was the
only country to not provide new parents with universal paid family
leave. 132 This policy also has a disproportionate racial effect because
four out of five black Southern mothers are the main breadwinners
in their family. 133 One could speculate that the disproportionate racial effect is not irrelevant. Arguably, Southern state legislatures
may have more readily accepted policies involving grossly disparate
impacts by gender because the effects of those policies were most
heavily experienced by the black population, which has, for most of
this country’s history, been politically irrelevant.

Id. at xxvi.
Id. at 35–36.
129
Id. at 36.
130
Id. at 69.
131
Id.; see also Rachel Blakely-Gray, Paid Sick Leave Laws by State: The
Chart, Map, and Accrual Info You Need, PATRIOT SOFTWARE: PAYROLL BLOG
(July 8, 2019), https://www.patriotsoftware.com/payroll/training/blog/state-mandated-paid-sick-leave-laws/.
132
OECD FAMILY DATABASE, PF2.1 PARENTAL LEAVE SYSTEMS 2–3 (last
updated
Aug.
2019),
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF2_1_Parental_leave_systems.pdf;
see
also
Gretchen Livingston, Among 41 Nations, U.S. is the Outlier When it Comes to
Parental Leave, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/26/u-s-lacks-mandated-paid-parental-leave/.
133
See ANDERSON, supra note 125, at 79.
127
128
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C.
LGBTQ+ Rights
An issue that further illustrates the Southern Exception and the
influence of the South on national policy in the United States at large
has been the fight for decriminalization and equality for members of
the LGBTQ+ community. Although the United States currently enjoys marriage equality, 134 the United States was otherwise very late
to embrace civil rights for the LGBTQ+ community. 135 Until the
Lawrence v. Texas 136 decision in 2003, the United States was the
only industrialized nation criminalizing same-gender sexual relations. 137 In Lawrence, as in Roper, 138 Justice Kennedy used international and comparative law 139 to justify eliminating sodomy laws
and to reject the reasoning of Bowers v. Hardwick, 140 the previous
case which refused to find sodomy laws unconstitutional. 141 Justice
Kennedy wrote that:
Where a case’s foundations have sustained serious
erosion, criticism from other sources is of greater significance. . . . [T]o the extent Bowers relied on values shared with a wider civilization, the case’s reasoning and holding have been rejected by the European Court of Human Rights, and that other nations
have taken action consistent with an affirmation of

134
See David Masci et al., Gay Marriage Around the World, PEW RES. CTR.
(May 7, 2019), http://www.pewforum.org/2017/08/08/gay-marriage-around-theworld-2013/.
135
See id.
136
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
137
See Masci et al., supra note 134.
138
See supra Section III.A.
139
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77 (“Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage
in intimate, consensual conduct . . . [and] the right . . . has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal
choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”).
140
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
141
See id. at 191–92, 195 (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not confer a fundamental right on homosexuals to engage in acts
of consensual sodomy, even where such conduct took place within the private
confines of an individual’s home).
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the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct. 142
In doing so, he earned a bitter rebuke from Justice Scalia, who again
argued that there was no consensus within the United States for finding sodomy laws unconstitutional. 143
In 2015, following a rapid increase in public approval of homosexuality, the United States Supreme Court declared the right to
marriage a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens through the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Obergefell v. Hodges. 144 While the United States undoubtedly deserves
credit for legalizing gay marriage, it was by no means the first country to legalize same-sex marriage. 145 In 2015, at the time of the
Obergefell decision, twenty-one other nations had already preserved
this right. 146 From the American perspective, it is interesting to look
how different the pace of reform occurred throughout the states. As
early as 2003, around the same time the first countries began legalizing gay marriage, Massachusetts became the first state to allow
gay marriage through the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. 147 In fact, Massachusetts Chief Justice Margaret Marshall has noted the similarities in
the attitudes towards race in her home country of South Africa and
the attitudes towards same-sex marriage of many Americans. 148 In
this sense, the Massachusetts opinion’s acknowledgement of changing attitudes towards same-sex marriage mirrored the Supreme
Court jurisprudence’s treatment of Southern Exceptionalism and the
attitudes of non-Southern states as discussed supra.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.
Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015).
145
Masci et al., supra note 134 (in 2000, the Netherlands was the first country
in the world to legalize gay marriage).
146
See Masci et al., supra note 134.
147
See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003).
148
Jesse Wegman, Why Massachusetts Led the Way on Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/opinion/whymassachusetts-led-the-way-on-same-sex-marriage.html (“Ms. Marshall grew up
in South Africa, where as a white university student she became deeply involved
in the growing anti-apartheid movement . . . As a result, she had what she calls a
‘very textured’ understanding of race and the law.”).
142
143
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In 2008, Connecticut followed suit, 149 with Iowa 150 and Vermont 151 joining the ranks in 2009 and New Hampshire 152 in 2010.
During this period and the years that followed, many other nonSouthern states, European countries, and Western Hemisphere
countries legalized same-sex marriage as well. 153
However, as recently as 2013, before Obergefell forced gay marriage on the Southern states, 154 not only did every Southern state
restrict gay marriage—except for West Virginia—they placed an
outright state constitutional ban on the practice. 155 By 2014, thirtyfive states had legalized gay marriage with the South being the predominant region in opposition. 156
Even though gay marriage enjoys the support of a majority of
Americans, it does not enjoy the same level of support in the
South. 157 As was the case with previous opposition to racial equality, Southern Christians, especially Southern Baptists, were particularly opposed to marriage equality. 158 If not for the Supreme Court
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411–12 (Conn. 2008).
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
151
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009).
152
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2010).
153
Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, Same-Sex Marriage: Global Comparisons, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 27, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/same-sex-marriage-global-comparisons; see also State-by-State History
of Banning and Legalizing Gay Marriage, 1994–2015, PROCON.ORG (Feb. 16,
2016, 1:44 PM), https://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resource
ID=004857.
154
See Felter & Renwick, supra note 153.
155
See Harry J. Enten, Same Sex Marriage and the South, GUARDIAN (July 1,
2013, 12:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/01/
same-sex-marriage-south.
156
Michael Muskal, Year in Review: Gay Marriage Dynamic in U.S. Shifted
Dramatically in 2014, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.latimes
.com/nation/la-na-year-ahead-gay-marriage-20141228-story.html.
157
See Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. (May 14, 2019),
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/; Michael Lipka, Gay Marriage Arrives in the South, Where the Public is Less Enthused, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/10/15/gay-marriage-arrives-in-the-south-where-the-public-is-less-enthused/.
158
Compare Resolution On Racial Reconciliation, supra note 68 with On
Same-Sex Marriage, S. BAPTIST CONVENTION (2003), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/1128; see also Niraj Chokshi, The Religious States of America, in 22 Maps,
149
150
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taking action, thereby enshrining marriage equality as a fundamental
right, it is unlikely that gay marriage would have been legalized anytime soon in the Southern states. 159
D.
Voting Rights
The issue of voting rights is central to the discussion of how a
Southern Exception has impacted American jurisprudence. The enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 160 was a milestone in
achieving legal and political equality of all Americans. 161 This legislation finally provided protection to African Americans in the
South who had been kept from voting through numerous means including intimidation, threats, physical violence, literacy tests, and
poll taxes. 162
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court overturned portions of the Voting Rights Act in the 2013 decision Shelby County v. Holder, opening the door for states and local jurisdictions to create impediments
for minority voting. 163 This ruling invalidated Section 4(b) of the
Voting Rights Act, 164 eliminating the preclearance requirement for
areas of the country that were deemed by Congress to have engaged
in discriminatory practices with respect to voting. 165 In a sense, Section 4(b) was the legislative equivalent of the Southern Exception,
as it subjected historically discriminatory regions of the country—

WASH. POST: GOVBEAT (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/02/26/the-religious-states-of-america-in-22-maps/.
159
See Lipka, supra note 157.
160
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101 et seq. (2019)).
161
See generally Louis Menand, The Color of Law: Voting Rights and the
Southern Way of Life, NEW YORKER (July 1, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2013/07/08/the-color-of-law (referring to the Voting Rights Act of
1965 as the “greatest legislative achievement” of the civil rights movement).
162
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, §§ 10101 et seq.; see also Menand, supra
note 161.
163
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013).
164
Id. at 557. Shelby County challenged sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. Id. at 540. Section 4(b) provided the “coverage formula” which
mainly singled out Southern states. Id. at 538. Section 5 required jurisdictions
covered by 4(b) to seek federal approval before enacting laws related to voting.
Id. at 534–35.
165
Id. at 535.
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often Southern states—to a preclearance requirement before changing their voting laws, while the remainder of the country was free
from such a requirement. 166
At the core of the majority opinion in Shelby is a rebuke of the
Voting Rights Act’s implied Southern Exception. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Roberts summarized his main justification
for overturning parts of the Voting Rights Act, stating that “[t]here
is no denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified
these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.” 167 Nevertheless, as the dissent noted, one of the core reasons voting patterns have changed for the better in the South is because of the continued enforcement of the Voting Rights Act itself. 168
The dissent’s perspective on the Southern states appears to be
somewhat validated by events since Shelby. For example, as of
2016, thirty-two states have voter-ID laws designed to make voting
more difficult. 169 In 2014, just one year after the Shelby decision,
North Carolina passed the worst voter suppression law in the country, shortening access to early voting by a week, passing stringent
new voter-ID laws, eliminating same-day registration and pre-registration for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, and ending out-of-precinct voting for statewide races. 170 All of these measures had the
Id. (“[Section] 4 of the Act applied that requirement only to some States—
an equally dramatic departure from the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”).
167
Id. 535. Chief Justice Roberts went on to explain that “Census Bureau data
indicate that African-American voter turnout has come to exceed white voter turnout in five of the six States originally covered by §5, with a gap in the sixth State
of less than one half of one percent.” Id.; see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No.
One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201, 203–04 (2009).
168
Id. at 560 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Andrew Cohen, After 50 Years,
the Voting Rights Act’s Biggest Threat: The Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22,
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/after-50-years-thevoting-rights-acts-biggest-threat-the-supreme-court/273257/.
169
See Jasmine C. Lee, How States Moved Toward Stricter Voter ID Laws,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/03/
us/elections/how-states-moved-toward-stricter-voter-id-laws.html.
170
N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 215 (4th Cir.
2016) (striking down North Carolina’s voter ID laws for “discriminatory intent”);
see also Penda D. Hair & Nat’l Journal, One Year After Shelby Decision, States
Have Moved to Restrict Voter Access, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2014),
166
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effect of decreasing minority voter turnout and eliminating many of
the strides made when Section 4(b) was in effect. 171 For example,
nearly 70% of all African Americans who voted in 2012 used early
voting. 172
Yet, it was not just North Carolina that began to roll back voter
protections shortly after the Shelby decision. Alabama, 173 Texas, 174
Virginia, 175 and Mississippi 176 also immediately passed voter suppression laws in the first year after Shelby. Notably, all of the aforementioned states were previously covered under Section 4(b) of the
Voting Rights Act, 177 although some other Republican-controlled
non-Southern states have passed similar measures. 178 Generally
speaking, states with a history of discriminating against African-

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/one-year-after-shelby-decision-states-have-moved-to-restrict-voter-access/431106/.
171
See N.C. State Conference of NAACP, 831 F.3d at 214 (“the new provisions target African Americans with almost surgical precision”).
172
Lee, supra note 169.
173
See ALA. CODE § 17-9-30 (2019). The voter identification requirement
went into effect in 2014. Id.
174
See TEX. ELECTION CODE ANN. § 63.0101 (West 2018). The law passed a
facial challenged in 2014. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 9–10 (2014) (mem.). In
a two-sentence, unsigned opinion, the Court allowed the voter identification law
to go into effect despite “virtually unchallenged evidence that [it] bears more
heavily on minority voters.” Id. at 11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations and
internal citations omitted). The Texas legislature has since revised the law. Veasey
v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 797 (5th Cir. 2018).
175
See VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-643 (2019). The voter identification requirement went into effect on July 1, 2014. Id.
176
See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-563 (2018). Until Shelby, the law was not
put into effect.
177
Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 538, 540 (2013); see also Lee, supra
note 169.
178
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3503.19 (West 2013). In 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the Ohio law. Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct.
1833, 1841 (2018); see also Terry Gross, Republic Voter Suppression Efforts Are
Targeting Minorities, Journalist Says, NPR (Oct. 23, 2018, 2:04 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/23/659784277/republican-voter-suppression-efforts-are-targeting-minorities-journalist-says (reporting Republican strategies to
tighten access to ballots in states like Ohio, Kansas, and North Dakota, which
have all passed voting laws since Shelby that have an adverse effect on minority
voters).
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American voting rights are the same states currently passing discriminatory voter suppression laws. 179
In fairness, if Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia deserve criticism
for being unwilling to consider issues within their given social context, Justice Kennedy’s decision to side with the majority in this case
seems very perplexing. 180 Looking at Justice Kennedy’s prior views
in favor of using international law as a legitimate factor to be considered in the United States legal system, 181 it seems incongruous
that Justice Kennedy did not consider the social conditions that originally necessitated the Voting Rights Act of 1965. While Justice
Kennedy has been willing to consider local social conditions and
comparative law in decisions concerning issues such as gender
rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and juvenile executions, he has been more
hesitant to determine that social issues such as voting rights and redistricting—with a known history of racial bias—are worthy of allowing for a Southern Exception. 182 Perhaps Justice Kennedy
simply exhibited the same blind spot with respect to race that gave
rise to Southern and American Exceptionalism in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia’s recognition of a Southern Exception in Supreme
Court jurisprudence reflects the understanding by some Supreme
Court Justices of the truly extraordinary political, cultural, and legal
history of the Southern United States, and by extension, of the
United States itself. The deference of a significant block of Justices
to the legal policies created by hundreds of years of racial oppression is reflected not only in these Justices’ defense of historical
Southern Exceptionalism from the legal norms of most the United
States, but also in their hostility to international and comparative law
in general, and specifically those norms that contravene Southern
Exceptionalism.
See Hair & Nat’l Journal, supra note 170.
See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 532 (2013).
181
See supra Parts III.A–B.
182
See Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 556–57; see also Joan Biskupic, Justice Kennedy’s Evolution on Race, CNN (Aug. 6, 2016, 8:10 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2016/08/06/politics/anthony-kennedy-scotus-race-voting/index.html (discussing
Chief Justice Roberts’s justification for the Shelby decision and Justice Kennedy’s
decision to join the majority opinion).
179
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Particularly significant for the thesis of this Article is that one of
the most prominent proponents of such an exception, at least in certain cases, was Justice Kennedy—a conservative Justice who could
not be accused of pursuing any kind of partisan agenda. Rather, he
recognized that the legal norms encompassed by Southern Exceptionalism were incompatible with the evolving norms of industrialized societies.

